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IMPEACHING WITH UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PALATABLE
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
JEFFREY COLE*

INTRODUCTION
ODAY,

we are witnessing in the area of criminal procedure the

sad spectacle of judges being swept along by pitiless and seemingly ineluctable logic to quixotic and unwise decisions. In all
too many cases, good sense is sacrificed to technicality, and a sound
principle is carried to an extravagant extreme.
The development and exegesis by the lower federal and state courts
of the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,' insofar as it
applies to the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes, illustrates this thesis nicely.
In Miranda, the Court held that pretrial statements are inadmissible
in the prosecution's case-in-chief unless the defendant was properly
informed of his right to remain silent and to have the aid of counsel.
Relying on Miranda, some courts have recently held that illegally
obtained statements are inadmissable even for purposes of impeachment. These holdings, however, appear to be at odds with the Court's
earlier decision in Walder v. United States,2 which carved out an exception to the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment as enunciated
in Weeks v. United States' and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States.4
* MR. COLE is a member of the Illinois Bar and received his J.D. from DePaul Uni-

versity in 1968. He is an attorney with the United States Department of Justice in the
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. He is a member of Who's Who in American
Colleges and Universities and was an Associate Editor of the DePaul Law Review. The
opinions of MR. COLE, as expressed in this article, do not necessarily reflect the position
of the United States Department of Justice.
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 347 U.S. 62 (1954).

3 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the Court held that evidence seized during an illegal
search in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal court.
4 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne, the Weeks doctrine was expanded to prohibit

the derivative use of evidence acquired during an illegal search and seizure.

25
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In Walder, a prior narcotics indictment had been dismissed after
the defendant had secured suppression of a heroin capsule obtained
through an unlawful search and seizure. During his trial on a second
narcotics offense committed two years later, the defendant voluntarily
took the stand and during his own direct examination made a sweeping
denial that he had ever had narcotics in his possession. The prosecution
was then permitted to introduce the evidence obtained from the earlier
search and seizure solely to impeach the defendant's credibility. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, quickly laid to rest
the petitioner's contention that allowing the Government to introduce
illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes contravened the
Weeks doctrine:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of
evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can
turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradicof the Weeks doctrine would be a pertion of his untruths. Such an extension
5
version of the Fourth Amendment.

The Walder rationale was not only eagerly embraced but also expanded by the federal courts to cover cases involving intangible evidence
obtained in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments as well as
tangible evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.'
However, with the coming of Miranda, doubts arose regarding the
continued viability of Walder. Today, the shadows of controversy are
lengthening. While the courts are divided on the issue, the commentators
have all concluded that Miranda has, if not sub silentio overruled

Walder, at least seriously brought its rationale into question.'
The objections to extending the Walder rationale to embrace Miranda
5

Supra note 2, at 65.

6

United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873
(1966) ; Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; White v. United States,
349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ;
Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Tate v. United States, 283
F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
7 Pitler, "The Fruit oj the Poisonous Tree" Revised and Skepardized, 56 CALIF.
L. REV. 579, 630 (1968); Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrine from Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 912 (1968); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the
Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CHm. L. REv. 939 (1967); Note, New York's Decision to
Allow Impeachment in Order to Find Truth, 13 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1967).
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violations have been predicated on the following grounds: (1) the exclusionary rule of the fifth amendment as expressly enunciated in Miranda
is irrecrusable; (2) Walder is antithetical to the deterrence rationale
on which the exclusionary rules themselves are bottomed; (3) the
Walder exception to the exclusionary rules may tend to discourage
defendants from testifying; and (4) Walder is violative of the principle
that the Government shall not profit from its own wrong or play an
ignoble part.
While it is manifest that even the slightest technical or inadvertent
violation of Miranda will render the evidence obtained inadmissable
in the Government's case-in-chief, it is by no means true that such a
technical violation' inexorably demands exclusion when the evidence
is offered to impeach the defendant's direct testimony when that testimony is "collateral" 9 to the case itself, and when the defendant has
initiated the inquiry.Y
In this article, I shall attempt to demonstrate that the above mentioned objections to the Walder doctrine are based on a misunderstanding and misapplication of the principles involved. I shall also attempt
to show that considerations of policy and justice demand that the
exclusionary rule of the fifth amendment, as well as that of the fourth,
admit of an impeachment exception in those instances where a mere
technicalMiranda violation has occurred, and the defendant has sought
affirmatively to lie to the trier of fact.
8 Throughout this article I shall use the phrase "technical violation" to refer to a
Miranda violation which is inadvertent or unintentional and whose character in no way
casts doubt on the voluntariness and reliability of the statements illegally elicited. Such
a violation might occur where all the Miranda warnings were given save that dealing
with the appointment of counsel in cases of indigency. See, e.g., Groshart v. United
States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.
1967).

9 The determination of "collateralness" does not seem to me to present especially difficult theoretical problems, and thus I have chosen to eliminate discussion of it. This determination, like so many others, must be made on an ad hoc basis and should be left
to the court's discretion. For an analysis of the collateral matters rule, see Comment,
The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 912 (1968);
Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CHi. L. Rxv.
939 (1967).
10 It is essential that the defendant be the initiator of the perjurious testimony in his
direct examination. The government, on cross-examination, cannot ask a leading question designed to elicit the perjury. Such a question is improper and the government
cannot impeach the defendant's answer with the illegally obtained evidence. Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1920). Cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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NOT DEMAND TOTAL EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
IN

VIOLATION OF ITS RULES

Great principles of constitutional law are not susceptible of statement
in an adjective or of reification in a cunningly wrought sentence. Nor
do the cases in which principles are contained reveal them merely for
the asking. The task of discovering the hypostasis or the general
principle in a case is rendered difficult since the "thing adjudged comes
to us often times swathed in obscuring dicta, which must be stripped
off and cast aside."" Distinguishing between dicta and decision, between what was said and what was done, is nothing less than distinguishing between reason and rationality on the one hand and naked
conclusions on the other. 2
This distinction is neither esoteric nor invidious but is demanded
by the "time-honored rules for reading cases-that cases hold only
what they decide ...

that decisions are one thing, gratuitous remarks

another. A stew may be a delicious dish. But a stew is not to be made
into law by throwing together indiscriminately decision and dicta. . .. ""
It also demanded by the oft-repeated and consistently followed principle
of constitutional adjudication "not to formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts presented in the record,
Garnerv. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961).. .

.""4 This

rule is but

a corollary of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's exhortation that the Court's
first duty is not to decide constitutional issues but to avoid them if at all
possible. 5
Just this past term, the Court demonstrated how vital it is to separate
dicta from decision. In Duncan v. Louisiana,6 the Court held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees the
right to trial by jury in state criminal proceedings where serious crimes
11 CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 29 (1921)

(emphasis added).

12 See Bisso v. Inland Waterway Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 100 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 144 (1938); Dayton
Power and Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290, 302 (1934)
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

13 Bisso v. Inland Waterway Corp., supra note 12.
14

Wainright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 83 (1968) (Warren, C. J., dissenting) ; Haynes

v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 101 (1968).
15 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946)
16391 U.S. 145 (1968).

(concurring opinion).

1968]

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

OBTAINED EVIDENCE

are involved. In answer to the assertion that Maxwell v. Dow,'7 Palko
v. Connecticut,"8 and Snyder v. Massachusetts9 contained statements
that the right to trial by jury was not demanded by due process, the
Court responded:
In neither Palko nor Snyder was jury trial actually at issue, although both cases
contain important dicta asserting that the right to jury trial is not essential to
ordered liberty and may be dispensed with by the States regardless of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments. These observations, though weighty and respec-

table, are nevertheless dicta, unsupported by holdings in this Court that a State
may refuse a defendant's demand for a jury trial when he is charged with serious
crime. Perhaps because the right to jury trial was not directly at stake, the
Court's remarks about the jury in Palko and Snyder took no note of past or current developments regarding jury trials, did not consider its purposes and functions, attempted no inquiry into how well it was performing its job, and did not
discuss possible distinctions between civil and criminal cases. In Malloy v. Hogan,
supra, the Court rejected Palko's discussion of the self-incrimination clause.
20
Respectfully, we reject the prior dicta regarding jury trial in criminal cases.

Thus, if we are to erect durable and proud constitutional edifices,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that they must be built upon a
foundation stronger than dicta. In short, the distinction between decision and dicta is a sine qua non of constitutional adjudication.
Yet, there is a tendency, perhaps a natural one, for judges to seize
adventitious statements and to build upon them. Surely resort to dictum
masquerading as precedent eases the work of a judge and satisfies a
longing for certainty and repose. Yet, repose, as Holmes tells us, is
not the destiny of man, and certainty is an illusion. And surely, no
one will gainsay that unthinking reliance on dicta is a poor surrogate
for enlightened analysis.
This penchant for relying on dicta to support a decision is clearly
22
manifested today by those courts, both state 2' and federal, which

17 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
18 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
19 291

U.S. 97 (1934).

20 391 U.S. at 145 (1968) (emphasis added). Cf. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364
n.11 (1968).
21 Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); Gaertner v. State,
35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967); State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). Contra, People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y. 2d 318, 221 N.E.2d
541 (1966). The Illinois Supreme Court has expressly reserved decision on this point.
People v. Luna, 37 Ill.2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967).
22 Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Wheeler v. United States,
382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.
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have heard in Miranda the death knell of Walder. Relying upon Chief
Justice Warren's tangential reference to impeachment,23 they have concluded that Miranda has undermined Walder.
Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Groshart v. United States, 4 in holding that no statement obtained in
violation of Miranda can be used for any purpose whatsoever, promulgated a rule of total exclusion without regard to the degree or nature
of the constitutional violation, and thus, a fortiori, without regard to
the voluntariness and reliability of the prior statement. Since the
Groshart opinion embraces and adopts the varying postures and approaches which have been taken in opposing the extension of Walder,
the case will serve, in a sense, as a laboratory in which to analyze and
evaluate these approaches as weil as to examine the doctrinal underpinnings of Walder.
On April 10, 1966, appellant was arrested at the Mexican border
after marijuana and amphetamine tablets were found in the station
wagon he was driving. Prior to questioning, Groshart was properly
advised of his fifth and sixth amendment rights as they existed prior
to Miranda v. Arizona. The customs agent who was questioning
Groshart did not, however, advise him that if he were indigent an
attorney would be appointed to represent him, nor did he inform
him that he had a right to the presence of counsel during any questioning.
During the course of the interrogation, appellant stated that an
individual named "John" had requested that he drive to Mexico to pick
up the contraband and bring it back in the station wagon which "John"
provided. At the trial, however, Groshart testified on direct examination
that he had borrowed the car from a friend who had in turn obtained
1967). Contra, United States ex rel. Kulis v. Mancusi, 272 F. Supp. 261 (1967), aff'd
per curiam, 383 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 943 (1967); Hicks v.
United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Fernandez v. Delgado, 257 F. Supp. 673
(D.C. Puerto Rico 1966).
23 The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner . . . . In fact statements merely intended
to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or
to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the
word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for
any other statement.
Supra note 1, at 476-77.
24392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968). Subsequent to this writing, the Second and District of
Columbia Circuits affirmed the Groshart rationale. United States v. Fox, - F.2d (2d Cir. 1968) ; Procter v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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it from his friend. Groshart further testified that the car had been
parked for 10 hours in Tijuana while he was sightseeing. This testimony
was in direct conflict with the statements earlier given to the customs
agent.
The statements given to the agent were excluded from the Government's case-in-chief on the basis of Miranda since that decision was
held to apply to trials commenced subsequent to it.25 However, the
district court admitted, for impeachment purposes only, certain of the
prior inconsistent statements relating to acquisition of the station
wagon in which the contraband was found. The district judge punctiliously instructed the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence was received, and the earlier statements regarding "John's"
request to Groshart to pick up the marijuana, etc., were wholly excluded
since they bore directly on the issue of guilt.
The jury found appellant guilty. On appeal, the circuit court reversed,
holding that the district court erred in admitting the "illegally" obtained evidence even for the limited purpose of impeaching the appellant's credibility. The court held that the express language of
Miranda forbids the use, under all circumstances, of evidence obtained
in violation of the fifth amendment and also stated its belief that
Miranda had "undermined" the rationale and validity of Walder.2 6
The court said that it found itself "impelled . . .by the force of
Miranda' 2 7 to its conclusion "that if statements are obtained from a
defendant in violation of the Miranda rules and if the interrogation
relates to an offense for which the defendant is ultimately brought to
trial, those statements, as well as any portions thereof, may not be' 2used
s
against the defendant at the trial for any purpose whatsoever.
However, even the most laconic reading of Miranda dispels the
notion that its language ineluctably demands that all evidence secured
in technical violation of its rules be excluded in all situations. As the
dissenting judge in Groshart pointed out: "[N]either in the main
opinion, nor in any of the three dissenting opinions in Miranda is the
word 'impeach' found, with the single exception of a tangential reference
in the majority opinion."29
25Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-734 (1966).
26392 F.2d at 178.
27 Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 181. See note 23.
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Certiorari was granted in Miranda "in order further to explore some
facets of the problems thus exposed by Escobedo v. Illinois . . of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation. . . ."0 The Chief Justice, after exploring the inherently coercive
effects of in-custody interrogation, went on to say that "[i]n the cases
before us today, given this background, we concern ourselves primarily
with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring."' 1 "The
question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable
during a period of custodial interrogation."8 2 "[W] e [seek] a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation."3
Subsequently, the Court in United States v. Wade 4 made it clear
that Miranda sought to obviate the inherent difficulties present in determining what goes on during in-custody interrogation by erecting
procedural safeguards designed to ensure that a suspect's fifth amendment rights would be protected throughout such interrogation. The
question relating to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence for
impeachment purposes was not before the Court in Miranda, and the
Court did not pretend to deal with it."
The statement of the Chief Justice in Miranda that "[t]he warnings
required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are ... prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made
by a defendant"80 does, perhaps, lend some plausibility to the claim
that prior inconsistent statements illegally obtained cannot be used
even for impeachment purposes. An apparently equally unequivocal
statement was made by Mr. Justice Holmes years earlier in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States: "The essence of a provision forbidding acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely that evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall
' 37
not be used at all.
.

30 Supra note 1, at 441.
31 Supra note 1, at 456 (emphasis added).
82 Supra note 1, at 460-461 (emphasis added).
88

Supra note 1, at 465.

84 388 U.S. 218 (1966).
85 Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180 (dissenting opinion) ; United States v.
Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) ; State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d

581, 583 (Ore. 1967) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). See text
relating to notes 41-42, inlra.
36 Supra note 1, at 476.
87 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (emphasis added).
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The petitioner in Walder relied extensively on Holmes' assertion.
However, he failed to take cognizance of the disparate factual circumstances of his own case, as if the extenuating possibilities of the application of a rule in all its myriad diversities could be compressed within
a formula. The petitioner's quest for certitude was so ardent that he
was ready, and indeed obsecrated the Court, in essence, to pay an
irrational reverence to a technique which used symbols of certainty
or universal immutability though experience has taught that generalizations are delusive and universals slippery.
But to have found in Mr. Justice Holmes' words an immutable command to be obeyed, no matter what the attendant circumstances, rather
than a prophecy to inspire, would have required the Court to ignore
Holmes' entire legal philosophy, for he himself had discussed the
"danger of reasoning from generalizations unless you have the particulars which they embrace in mind"38 and had come to realize that
"[a] generalization is empty so far as it is general. 3 9 Justice Frankfurter could hardly have embarked on such a barren enterprise, for no
judge of modern times was more familiar with Holmes and his philosophy than he. Indeed, in Holmes he found both his hero and his inspiration. Thus, fully cognizant of the complexities and possibilities of
injustice inherent in a changeless formula, and profoundly aware that
no formula was meant to serve as a universal, Justice Frankfurter for
the Court in Walder held that impeachment of a perjurious defendant
could be achieved by the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
if and when he initiated the inquiry by seeking to affirmatively lie to
the trier of fact on direct examination.
If Justice Holmes' rather explicit statement in Silverthorne is not
irrecrusable, then that of the Chief Justice in Miranda likewise should
not be. Neither Justice Holmes in Silverthorne nor the Chief Justice
in Miranda was addressing himself to the question of admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes. Miranda itself
has been the object of excoriation-its constitutional justifications the
object of serious and penetrating analysis and questioning. Thus, to
take a single oblique reference to impeachment from a lengthy and
complex opinion, which did not even concern itself with the question
of impeachment, and push it to its logical limits is unwarranted and
unwise.
38 Holmes,
39 Id.

Law in Science and Science in Law, 12

HARv.

L. REv. 443, 461 (1899).
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Yet, notwithstanding all this, to the Government's contention that
in Miranda the Supreme Court did not intend to forbid use by the
prosecution of illegally obtained evidence under all circumstances, the
court in Groshartanswered:
While this interpretation of the Court's language may be possible, we cannot
accept it as correct. It would be a strained interpretation, an interpretation inconsistent with the Chief Justice's direct reference to the former use of such
statements "to impeach" and with his immediately following injunction: "These
statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not
be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other
statement." 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629.40

Yet, the court's rejection of the Government's request to distinguish
between the holding and the dicta in Miranda is, as has been shown,
contrary to the basic principles of constitutional adjudication and to
the explicit commandments of the Court itself. It is, in part, this failure
to discard dicta which has led the Ninth Circuit, as well as other courts,
to an erroneous result.
Last term, the Supreme Court itself indicated that Miranda did not
abrogate the use of illegally obtained statements for impeachment purposes. Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Harrison v. United States
noted:
Similarly, an inadmissible confession preceding a plea of guilty would taint the
plea. And, as a final consequence, today's decision would seem to bar the use of
confessions defective under Miranda or Mallory from being used for impeach41
ment when a defendant takes the stand and deliberately lies.

In response to this, Justice Stewart speaking for the majority stated:
And, contrary to the suggestion made in a dissenting opinion today,... we decide
here only a case in which the prosecution illegally introduced
the defendant's
42
confession in evidence against him at trial in its case-in-chief.

Harrison,by implication, makes it clear that the Court regards the
Walder exception to the exclusionary rules as at least unaffected by
Miranda. Whether Harrison has affected the Walder exception is, of
course, another question which will be dealt with later.4 3 Thus, we must
withhold our imprimatur from those decisions such as Groshart which
40 392 F.2d at 177-178 (emphasis added).
U.S. 219 (1968) (emphasis added).
2d. at 219 n.9 (emphasis added).

41392

4

43 See note 68 et seq., infra.
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have relied so heavily on the dicta in Miranda. If, indeed the doctrinal
underpinnings of Walder have been eroded, the erosion process must
have proceeded under an impetus other than Miranda.

Walder WILL

NOT ENCOURAGE VIOLATIONS OF

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Since their inception, the exclusionary rules of the fourth and fifth
amendments have been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging
lawless police conduct. Thus, their major thrust is a deterrent one. 4
Those who feel that Walder should be overruled, or at least not extended to Mirandasituations, believe that Walder is dissonant with the
spirit of the deterrence rationale. That is, they believe that even allowing statements obtained in technical violation of the Miranda rules to
be introduced for impeachment purposes will encourage police misconduct. This kind of argument seems spurious, for it rests on the
assumption that the police will now consciously violate Miranda in an
attempt to obtain incriminating statements which the state may use for
impeachment notwithstanding their knowledge that these statements
are inadmissible in the state's case-in-chief.
One state court has, in effect, judicially noticed that:
If we should today adopt a restrictive application of the exclusionary rule, the
result could be a major step backward. This court would, in effect, be saying to
the overzealous that police officers will be free in the future to interrogate suspects

secretly, at arms length, without counsel, and without advice, so long as they
use means consistent with threat-or-promise voluntariness, and so long as they
understand that they may file the information only for use to keep the defendant
honest. Thus, the police could, at their option, take a calculated risk: By giving
up the possibility of using the suspect's statements in the state's case, they could
obtain by unconstitutional means and store
away evidence to use if the defendant
45
should elect upon trial to take the stand.

This is an egregious piece of tendentious speculation. My unwillingness to accept this thesis stems not from any belief that police officers
are the apotheosis of the Platonic "Guardians," for surely they are
44 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, n.10 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-635 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961). Compare Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).

45 State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581, 583 (Ore. 1967) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 943 (1967).
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not.4" Rather, it stems from my inability to ascribe to them those
Mephistophelean qualities and that degree of legal sophistication upon
which such a hypothesis must necessarily rest.
To be sure, persons of speculative minds can employ sophisticated
and persuasive arguments which suggest vague possibilities that the
police will be encouraged to violate Miranda if Walder is extended to
embrace intangible evidence. However, as a matter of good sense
"[t]hat which is [obviously true] may not be disregarded and be
brought into the realm of that which is controvertible and questionable
by the mere garb in which propositions are clothed." 4
But beyond this, the example of the violation cited above by the
Oregon Supreme Court is not one of a technical and inadvertent nature.
On the contrary, it is a cold, deceptive, calculating attempt to violate
a defendant's fifth amendment rights. No one would contend that
statements elicited as the result of such conduct, the veracity and voluntariness of which are highly suspect, should be admitted even for the
limited purpose of impeachment.4 To the discriminating eye, the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis is not persuasive and its ex-cathedra pronouncements not especially edifying.
Neither Walder, nor any of the cases directly interpreting it, indicates that the principle of limited admissibility for collateral impeachment purposes is inapplicable when evidence is excluded because
unconstitutionally obtained. An exclusionary rule, whether based on
constitutional principles or not, is meant primarily to protect those
accused of crime from unfair or unconstitutional police procedures by
removing the strongest police incentive to use such procedures. Such
a rule often results in excluding highly reliable evidence in order to
ensure that those who enforce the law will not profit from violating the
law. But it does not follow that, if such evidence is excluded for one
purpose, it must be excluded for all purposes. It is enough to deter
illegal police activity if the Government is prohibited from using evidence obtained by such activity to prove its direct case. In view of
this adequate penalty, to deny the Government the use of voluntary,
46 Police misconduct is so well known that it scarcely needs citation of authority. See,
e.g., Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 572 n.3
et seq. (1961).
47 Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 284 (1914).
48United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873
(1966).
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reliable, prior inconsistent statements to impeach contrary testimony at
trial would be an unnecesary impediment in the search for truth.
Thus, the fear that to interpret the exclusionary rule to permit the
use of suppressed evidence for impeachment under the limited and circumscribed conditions detailed in Walder and its progeny would be so
derogatory of the policy of the rule as to reduce the fifth amendment
to a form of words is unfounded. No one has ever said that the
Court's decision in Walder has in any way detracted from the vitality
and protection of the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment. The
police have not been encouraged to violate the precepts of the fourth
to gain incriminating evidence to be used for impeachment. The paucity of cases in this area testifies to this. And yet, this speculative cry
of fear went up in 1953 just as it is going up today.
The fifteen-year history of the Walder rule in cases involving the
fourth amendment is a persuasive argument against the claim that its
application to fifth amendment cases will encourage illegal police activities. If Walder has not provided the impetus for law enforcement officials to violate the fourth amendment, then surely it does not follow
that it will provide the motive force for violations of the fifth.
Reliance on the deterrence rationale is reliance on a slender reed
for other reasons also. The deterrence rationale logically dictates that
all unconstitutionally obtained evidence be excluded from criminal
trials without regard to whether the defendant has standing to complain of the illegal activity of the police or not.49 This of course would
necessitate a total abolition of the rules relating to standing. The Supreme Court's reluctance to take this step clearly demonstrates that
the deterrence rationale, like all concepts, is not an absolute, that its
boundaries are measured by other considerations and policies, and that
its efficacy can be impaired by misapplication. 0
Beyond this, however, it is incongruous to assert that Walder is
somehow antithetical to the deterrence rationale notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's decision in Chapman v. California."' In Chapman, the
Court promulgated a harmless-constitutional-error rule which recog49 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 n.12 (1967); Mancusi v. DeForte 392
U.S. 364 (1968).
5OIn Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Chief Justice noted: "The exclusionary
rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial control. . . . Moreover, in some
contexts the rule is ineffective as a deterrent." (emphasis added). Id. at 13.
51386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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nized "that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting
of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction."5 2 However, once
a constitutional infraction has been shown, the Government must
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained."58
The Chapman rule was designed to obviate reversal as a mandatory
remedy in cases involving errors of constitutional dimension and to
substitute judgment for the a priori application of a rule of automatic
reversal which was but an unnecessary concession to technicality and
54
thus wholly antithetical to a jurisprudence of conceptions.
Accepting the thesis that the deterrence rationale has an existence
separate and apart from the more catholic doctrine that the Government shall not profit from its own wrong,5 5 it is difficult to square Chapman with the deterrence rationale. Indeed, if the latter is pressed to
its logical limits, reversal would appear to be mandatory. The Court,
by its decision in Chapman, has made it clear, however, that what in
effect is judicial excusal of police misconduct under certain circumstances will not encourage further police misconduct.
Thus, since Chapman, which allows convictions to stand, non
obstante the state's introduction in its case-in-chief of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for the purpose of proving guilt, is not dissonant
with the deterrence rationale, then Walder, which only deals with impeachment on "collateral matters," surely cannot be.
In summary, the concern that an extension of the Walder principle
to embrace statements obtained in technical violation of Miranda will
encourage police misconduct finds no support either in reason, experi52 Id. at 22.
53 Id. at 24.
54 See, e.g., Lockett v. United States, 390 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1968); Ethington v.
United States, 379 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1967) ; Ware v. United States, 376 F.2d 717 (7th
Cir. 1967). Cf. Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1966).

55 Recently, Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219
(1968) said: "Nor would I rule out the possibility that a direct product of unlawful
official activity might properly be excludable as a fruit of that activity-even where the

product is so unforeseeable that a deterrent rationale for exclusion will not suffice-on
the ground that the Government should not play an ignoble part." But see Mr. Justice
White's dissenting opinion in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) and Mr.
Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Bumper v. North Carolina, 390 U.S. 986 (1968).
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ence, or judicial precedent. Such an extension will, in no way, frustrate
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rules.
THE

Walder

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULES DOES

NOT IMPEDE A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY

One of the more serious objections to extending the Walder
rationale to cases involving technical Miranda violations concerns the

possible inhibitory effect on a defendant's exercise of his right to testify. It was said in Groshartthat the "ability of the prosecution to use
portions of the statements illegally obtained from the defendant for
impeachment purposes may . . . force the defendant to forgo his

right to testify in his own behalf." 56
However, conceding, arguendo, that a defendant in a criminal trial
may well decide not to testify because he is aware that his "collateral"
testimony may be impeached by illegally garnered evidence begins
rather than ends the inquiry.
The court in Groshart, in laying inordinate and exclusive stress on
the method by which the evidence was acquired made a fundamental
and serious error, for, in effect, it failed to ask itself the proper question. Consequently, the court's answer was incorrect, for correct answers can never be obtained by asking the wrong question and thereby
obfuscating the real one.
In answering the limited inquiry of whether Walder will impose an
unconstitutional burden on a defendant's right to testify, the Ninth
Circuit's attention should not have been directed to how the evidence
was acquired, but rather to the question of whether the illegality of the
method of acquisition imposed a burden on the defendant different
either in kind or degree from that which would be imposed upon him
had the evidence been obtained legally.
Phrased somewhat differently, the real question is whether a defendant would be less reluctant to testify in his own behalf had the evidence available for impeachment not been obtained illegally. When the
problem is viewed in this, its proper perspective, it becomes clear that
the "infringement on the right to testify" argument is predicated upon
a misunderstanding of the principles involved. Perhaps a paradigm will
illustrate this thesis.
56392 F.2d at 180. Accord, State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 943 (1967).
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Let us assume that certain statements were obtained from two defendants, A and B, and let us further assume that the statements were
identical, that the prosecutions were for the same offense, that the
statements were voluntary and reliable, and finally that A's statements
were obtained illegally5 7 while those of B were obtained legally.
It may well be true that defendant A will be somewhat reticent
about taking the stand and perjuring himself. However, this hesitancy
is different neither in kind nor degree from that which defendant B
experiences. The determination of both defendants to testify or not, in
the example above, is wholly independent of the method by which the
evidence available for impeachment against them was secured. Is it
not now manifest that the illegal method by which the evidence was
obtained can have no legal impact on A's decision to testify or refrain
from testifying, for the evidence available for impeachment purposes
is identical in both cases. A, therefore, is placed under no greater legal
burden than B in determining whether to take the witness stand.
To recapitulate, the legality or illegality of the method of acquisition
of the evidence has absolutely no legal bearing on the specific and
narrow question of whether Walder will cause a defendant to forgo
his right to testify. It has been demonstrated that the decision to testify or refrain from testifying is, in legal contemplation, nowise predicated on the legality or illegality of the police action in securing the
evidence. Rather, it is determined by a melange of imponderables
which are loosely embraced by that time-worn phrase, "trial strategy."
This is not, of course, to assert that the illegality of the method
of acquisition is unimportant in the ultimate determination of the
broad question to which this article is addressed. It is merely to say
that in playing not even a soupcon in a defendant's ultimate choice to
testify, the conduct of the police cannot serve as a staging area from
which to launch an attack against Walder-an attack predicated on the
"infringement of the right to testify" argument. The illegality of police
conduct becomes important in determining whether the Walder principle is antithetical to that most fundamental of propositions-namely,
that the Government shall not profit from its own wrong or play an
ignoble part. It also is important in deciding whether Walder is contrary to the "imperative of judicial integrity." I have, however, dealt
with these questions elsewhere in the article."8
57 The type of illegality referred to here would involve only a technical Miranda violation as described in note 8, supra.

58 See note 85 et seq., infra.
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Once the specious nature of the "infringement on the right to testify" argument is made manifest, the arguments against Walder which
are predicated upon the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. California 9 are rendered inapplicable. In Griffin, the Supreme Court, in
holding that the fifth amendment prohibits comment on a defendant's
failure to take the stand, stated that such comment "is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly."6 ° However, since, as
has been shown, an illegal method of acquiring evidence imposes no
greater burden on a defendant's right to testify than does a legal one,
Griffin is inapposite.
In Groshart, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals predicated its
assertion that Walder might force a defendant to forgo his right to
testify on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Simmons v. United
States,6 in which it was held that statements given by a defendant in
a suppression hearing could not be used by the Government "at the
trial on the issue of guilt."6' 2
The Court was sensitive in Simmons to the "Hobson's choice" faced
by a defendant who wishes to assert his fourth amendment right but
realizes that the price for such assertion may be the relinquishment
of his fifth amendment right. The Court stated:
It seems obvious that a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissable against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testimonial proof of standing necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim ...

[W]e find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another. 63

This argument, as applied to Groskart, has a superficial plausibility on
the word level, but if our attention is directed to substance rather than
symbols the spuriousness of the argument is exposed.
In Simmons, the defendant was placed on the horns of a constitutional dilemma. If he chose one constitutional right, he had to forgo
another.64 Clearly, a defendant who has given statements without the
full Miranda warning is not confronted with this "Hobson's choice" in
59380 U.S. 609 (1965).
60
Id.at 614.
61390 U.S. 377 (1968).
62 d. at 390 (emphasis added).
63d. at 392.
64 Compare United States v. Woody, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 961 (1967).
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determining whether he should testify. Nor, as we have seen, is he
faced with any greater compulsion not to testify than is a defendant
from whom the evidence was obtained legally.
In United States v. Jackson, 5 the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act"6 was unconstitutional, because, in making the risk of death the price for asserting the
right to trial by jury, the provision thereby impaired the free exercise
of that constitutional right.
Jackson, in principle, may be likened to Griffin, for both involved
the imposition of an impermissible burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, with the "inevitable effect [being] . . .to discourage
assertion of"67 that constitutional right. But what was said earlier about
Griffin applies with equal force to Jackson, and both cases are thus
distinguishable from the Walder situation and in no way bolster the
argument that the use of illegally obtained evidence causes a defendant
to forgo his right to testify.
Unquestionably, the most significant Supreme Court decision to date,
as regards the continued validity of Walder is Harrison v. United
States.6" There the petitioner was brought to trial before a jury in the
District of Columbia upon a charge of felony-murder. At that trial,
the prosecution introduced three confessions allegedly made by the
petitioner while he was in the custody of the police. After these confessions had been admitted in evidence, the petitioner took the witness
stand and testified to his own version of the events leading to the victim's death. The jury found the petitioner guilty, but the court of
appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the petitioner's confessions had been illegally obtained and were therefore inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Upon remand, the case again came to trial before a jury. This time
the prosecutor did not offer the alleged confessions in evidence. But
he did read to the jury the petitioner's testimony at the prior trialtestimony which placed the petitioner, shotgun in hand, at the scene
of the killing. The testimony was read over the objection of defense
counsel, who argued that the petitioner had been induced to testify at
65 387 U.S. 929 (1968).
66 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
67 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
68392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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the former trial only because of the introduction against him of the inadmissible confessions. The petitioner was again convicted, and the
court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the petitioner's trial testimony was the inadmissible
fruit of the illegally procured confessions.
In Harrison,the Court did not question the general evidentiary rule
that a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence
against him in later proceedings. A defendant who chooses to testify
waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect
to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the
witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the
lawful evidence adduced against him. 9
Here, however, the petitioner testified only after the Government had illegally
introduced into evidence three confessions, all wrongfully obtained, and the same
principle that prohibits the use of confessions so procured also prohibits the use
of any testimony impelled thereby-the fruit of the poisonous tree, to invoke a
time-worn metaphor. For the "essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392. .

.

.In concluding that the petitioner's

prior testimony could be used against him without regard to the confessions
that had been introduced in evidence before he testified, the court of appeals
relied on the fact that the petitioner had "made a conscious tactical decision to
seek acquittal by taking the stand after [his] in-custody statements had been let
in . . ." But that observation is beside the point. The question is not whether

the petitioner made a knowing decision to testify, but why. If he did so in order
to overcome the impact of confessions illegally obtained and hence improperly
by the same illegality that rendered
introduced, then his testimony was tainted
70
the confessions themselves inadmissible.

The argument that the detractors of Walder will attempt to make
is the converse of that made in Harrison.In Harrison,the Court found
that "the petitioner's trial testimony was in fact impelled by the prosecution's wrongful use of his illegally obtained confessions. 7' The converse of this argument is that a defendant is "impelled" not to take the
stand because of the wrongful actions of the police in obtaining statements from him in violation of Miranda.
This argument is, however, legally dysgenic. In Harrison, the Gov69 Accord, People v. Luna, 37 Il1.2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967).
70 392 U.S. 219, 222-223 (1968).
711d. at 224 (emphasis added).
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ernment exacerbated its original illegality by offering "tainted" evidence at the trial.7 2 In such a case the causal connection between the
Government's improper introduction of the illegally obtained confessions and the defendant's decision to testify is manifest.
"The springs of conduct are subtle and varied," Mr. Justice Cardozo
once observed. "One who meddles with them must not insist upon too
nice a measure of proof that the spring he released was effective to the
exclusion of all others."7 3 After quoting this statement of Justice Cardozo, the Court in Harrison went on to say that "[h] aving 'released
the spring' by using the petitioner's unlawfully obtained confessions
against him, the Government must show that its illegal action did not
induce his testimony.74
The Walder situation is totally distinguishable from Harrison, the
latter more closely resembling Agnello v. United States75 and Fahy v.
Connecticut.7 6 In a Walder situation the Government does not introduce any evidence at all. The decision to testify or refrain from testifying is not "impelled" by any action on the Government's part. Contrast this with the situation presented by Harrison, Agnello, and Fahy.
In each of those cases, the Government, through affirmative action,
was the prime mover, the initiator of the defendant's conduct.
Another salient distinction which causes the Harrison situation to
sharply contrast with a Walder situation involves the nature of the
evidence being used, and the use to which that evidence is put. In Harrison, the Court was dealing with the use of an improperly obtained
confession offered by the Government in its case-in-chief to prove
guilt. The Supreme Court has always viewed confessions as particularly weighty with the jury.77
In a Walder situation, however, the evidence introduced is not a
confession but rather deals only with matters "collateral" to the crime.
Moreover, the evidence is used not in the case-in-chief to prove guilt
72Cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); Douglas v. Alabama 380 U.S. 415
(1965); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1920).
73 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
74

d. at 225.

75269 U.S. 20 (1920).
76375

U.S. 85 (1963).

77 Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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but only for impeachment of the defendant's credibility. The Court, in
Harrison, took pains to point out that it was deciding "here only a
case in which the prosecution illegally introduced the defendant's
confession in evidence against him at trial in its case-in-chief."8
In order for the Harrison rationale to give succor to the argument
that extending the Walder principle to embrace Miranda violations
would "impel" a defendant to forgo his right to testify, the defendant's reticence would have to be classified as a "fruit" of the original
police misconduct. To carry the "fruit of the poisonous tree" rationale
so far would be both extravagant and unwise.
However, even assuming that the argument is viable, I believe Harrison is nontheless inapposite. In Nardone v. United States,79 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of
such connection may have become so attenuated as to
good sense, however,
80
dissipate the taint.

If we substitute the phrase "illegal activity" for "illicit wire-tapping"
and replace the words "Government's proof" with "the defendant's
reluctance to testify," it is manifest that any causal connection between
a technical Miranda violation and a defendant's unwillingness to testify has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nor, can it be
argued that the defendant has been forced to forgo a constitutional
right by the Government's "exploitation of [the initial] illegality." 8'
Thus, the notion that to allow the use of illegally obtained evidence
for the limited purpose of impeachment on "collateral" matters would
somehow have an inhibitory effect on the defendant's taking the stand
is a spider's web which the first breath of analysis blows away. This
limited use would only preclude the defendant from taking advantage
of the Government's error to testify falsely. That is, where a defendant seeks to profit from the Government's error to affirmatively lie to
the trier of fact, the rule of exclusion should not be invoked to preclude the prosecution from nullifying the effect of such perjurious
testimony.
78392 U.S. 219, 223 (1968)

(emphasis added).

70 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
80
Id. at 341.
81 Cf. Wong Sun v. Unted States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).

72, supra.

See cases cited in note
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By wisely limiting the application of the exclusionary rule, a defendant will be deprived of nothing to which he is lawfully entitled. All
that is denied him is a license to perjure himself. Justice cannot suffer
by a limitation of the rule in the narrow circumstances outlined earlier;
rather, it will be defeated by a Procrustean application.
The Groshartrule of total exclusion ignores the basic principle that
a witness impeached on the basis of prior inconsistency "may always
endeavor to explain away the effect of the supposed inconsistency by
relating whatever circumstances would naturally remove it."82 It incorrectly presupposes that juries lack the judgment and good sense
necessary to distinguish between a defendant's veiled attempts at
deception and his honest and sincere explanations of the prior inconsistency. Whatever cogency such an argument may possess as applied
to jury trials surely shivers into nothingness when we are dealing with
a bench trial. I believe, as did Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that most
judges, especially federal ones, possess "a high standard of professional
competence, good sense, fairness and courage" when it comes to impartiality in the receipt and use of evidence.8" Surely receipt of evidence
solely for purposes of impeachment on "collateral" matters does not
require discrimination so subtle that it is a feat beyond the capabilities
of an experienced judicial mind.8 4 Indeed, if judges and juries cannot
make such discriminations, then all our legal processes are but exercises in futility.
More importantly, the rule of total exclusion is too parochial in
scope, for it would render the courts of the United States impotent to
cope with perjury. In effect, it gives a defendant the unbridled license
to commit perjury with impunity. It blindly allows a frontal assault on
the integrity of the federal judiciary in the name of constitutionality.
It is an unwise progeny, conceived in haste and born of misunderstanding.
Walder

Is NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE GOVERNMENT
SHALL NOT PROFIT FROM ITS OWN WRONG

In the world of concepts and ideas, as elsewhere, there is a tendency
toward the reproduction of kind. Hence, every judgment has a gen823 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1044 (3d ed. 1940); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d
244, 250 (2d Cir. 1968).
83Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 488-489 (1948) (concurring opinion).
Accord, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 346-347 (1942).
84 Compare Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968) and authorities cited therein.

1968]

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

OBTAINED EVIDENCE

erative power and a directive force for future cases of even a similar
nature. Once declared, the judgment is a progenitor of a new stock of
descent; it is charged with a vital force; it is the well-spring from
which new principles or norms may evolve, uniting with other strains
and permeating the interstitial tissue of the law.
Logic, perhaps more than any other principle of selection, guides
the progression of development of concepts, for it has the primacy that
comes from natural and orderly logical succession."5 Yet, while extending a legal principle by a process of purely logical deduction may
satisfy our craving for certainty, we must be cautious not to stray
too far from our starting point save where the words of the precedent
import a policy that goes well beyond them. Thus, mere "[a]cquiescence in a precedent [such as Miranda] does not require approval of
its extension," 8" for "[t] he Constitution commands neither logical sym'
metry nor exhaustion of a principle." 87
A determination as to whether a given precedent should be carried
to its logical conclusion, or, if not, where the line limiting its growth
should be drawn, can only be made after an examination of the ends
which the judgment subserves, for an appeal to origins, to naked precedent, will be vain, its significance perverted, unless tested and illumined
by an appeal to ends.
In failing to properly assess the ends which the exclusionary rule of
the fifth amendment as enunciated in Miranda seeks to achieve, the
Ninth Circuit in Groshart committed a grievous error-one which, I
believe, led to its erroneous conclusion. Just as "[w] e must look to the
purpose of our new standards... and the effect on the administration
of justice""8 to determine retroactivity, so too must we carefully examine the purpose of the exclusionary rules and the effect of a particular application of them before we can determine whether they are
to admit of any exceptions. Mere resort to a sterile dialectic will not
suffice, for as Mr. Justice Holmes once said, "a body of law is more
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred
articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the
85 Cf. CARDozo,

THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 56 (1924) ; CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE

JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (1921); SCHAEFFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 8 (1966).
86

Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181 (1949)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

87 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 468 (1949).
88 Johnson v. United States, 384 U.S. 719, 727 (1966). See also Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII: 25

grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in
words.89

What then are the ends which the exclusionary rules of the fourth
and fifth amendments seek so assiduously to achieve and, in the
final analysis, are the constitutional foundations underlying the rules?
They seek, of course, to ensure Government's respect for the dignity,
inviolability, and integrity of its citizens 0 But, beyond this, their real
and chief predicates are deterrence of police misconduct and the "imperative of judicial integrity."'" This latter concept has, since its first
explicit enunciation in Elkins v. United States,92 assumed a vital role in
constitutional theory. Thus, it appears that the "interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process" are sought
also to be protected by the exclusionary rules. 93
The Government cannot, of course, violate the commands of the fifth
amendment and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a
conviction any more than they can violate the fourth amendment and
profit therefrom. Nor may the Government use the fruits of its illegal
conduct indirectly any more than it can directly.94 However, while
"[i] t is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained[,] [i] t is quite another to say
that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in
the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths."95
"The tyranny of labels . . must not lead us to leap to a conclusion
that a... [violation) which in one set of facts may stand for oppression
or enormity is of like effect in every other. 96
.

89 The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 468-469 (1897).

90 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
91 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 224, n.10
(1968) ; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
92364 U.S. 206 (1960).
93 See cases cited in note 91, supra. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-729 (1965). Cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 117 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
94

Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).

95Id. at 65.
96 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)

(Cardozo, J.).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter's solution to the problem presented by
Walder is in effect a recognition that the "integrity of the fact-finding
process" is just as susceptible to attack from the unbridled perjury
of a defendant as from any illegal activity of Government, and that
the attacks of the former are no less rapacious or destructive than those
of the latter. Indeed, the former may ultimately have an internecine
effect far beyond our imagination.
By excluding illegally obtained evidence from the Government's
case-in-chief, the exclusionary rules remove the incentive for the police
to employ illegal procedures in their fact-gathering process and thereby
achieve, at least partially, the twin desiderata on which these rules
are based. However, by interpreting the exclusionary rules to demand
that unconstitutionally seized, though reliable, evidence be inadmissible
for impeachment of "collateral" matters, part of the basic policy upon
which the rules rest is thwarted, for perjury would now be condoned,
and the "integrity" of the federal judiciary would be in serious jeopardy.
It would be a sorry spectacle to see criminal defendants taking the
stand and committing perjury with impunity while the courts stood
helplessly by, fettered by a rule of their own making, a rule which is
neither commanded by the constitution nor by any sound principle
of justice.
The importance of protecting the integrity of the courts from being
undermined by the nefarious acts of defendants in criminal cases
received the attention of the Supreme Court just recently in Osborn v.
United States. 7 In Osborn, the petitioner was endeavoring to bribe
a member of a jury panel in a prospective criminal trial. The individual
whom the petitioner had approached to contact a member of the jury
panel informed the Government of the petitioner's illegal offer. Subsequently, he made an affidavit which was shown to two judges of the
district court. These judges then authorized electronic surveillance of
Osborn. The Court described the situation thusly:
The situation which faced the two judges of the district court when they were
presented with Vick's affidavit on November 8, and the motivations which
prompted their authorization of the recorder are reflected in the words of Chief
Judge Miller. As he put it, "The affidavit contained information which reflected
seriously upon a member of the bar of this court, who had practiced in my
court ever since I have been on the bench. I decided that some action had to
97385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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be taken to determine whether this information was correct or whether it was
false. It was the most serious problem that I have had to deal with since I have
been on the bench. I could not sweep it under the rug."
So it was that, in response to a detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission
of a specific criminal offense directly and immediately affecting the administration of justice in the federal court, the judges of that court jointly authorized
the use of a recording device for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the affidavit's allegations. As the district judges recognized,
it was imperative to determine whether the integrity of their court was being
undermined.... 98

Assuming that the evidence obtained by the Government is wholly
reliable, there is no reason for allowing a criminal to undermine the
"integrity of the court" by perjuring himself. The integrity of our
legal system suffers no less by what occurred in Groshart and Walder
than by what was attempted in Osborn. The Constitution of the United
States was never intended as a facility for crime. It is intended to
prevent oppression, and "[t]here is a danger that, if the [courts do]
not temper [their] doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, [they]
will convert the Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."9
Those who decry the Walder exception to the exclusionary rules
have relied heavily on Justice Brandeis' eloquent dissent in Olmstead
v. United States °° where he argued that illegally obtained evidence
should be excluded:
[I]n order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; and in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination . . . . In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent omnipresent teacher; for good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law breaker, it
breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself:
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes
in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face.' 0 '

Of course, I accept the underlying idea of what is surely a noble
principle, and I suppose no one would deny it. Indeed, it is but an
98 Id. at 329-330 (emphasis added).
9 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949)
100 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
101 Id. at 484-485.

(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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exquisite expression of the concept which is perhaps the touchstone of
our legal system: the Government shall not profit from its own wrong.
However, uncritical acceptance of such a generalization or formula
can never adequately solve complex and concrete questions, for as Mr.
Justice Holmes has said, "[G]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases."

10 2

But beyond this, there is a danger in blithely accepting "lovely"
phrases, for there is a tendency whereby phrases are made to do service
for critical analysis by being turned into dogma. Thus, "[r] eady-made
catch-phrases may conceal but do not solve serious constitutional probof
lems. 'Too broadly generalized conceptions are a constant source
3
fallacy.' Holmes, J., in Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 600. M0
Mr. Justice Brandeis' entire professional life, both at the Bar and
on the Bench, was devoted to analysis and reason, to combatting the
tyranny of labels and of absolutes. He, no less than Justice Holmes
before him and Justice Frankfurter after him, sought to inculcate into
legal ratiocination the idea that no formula is meant to serve as a
universal, that no formula or generalization will ever be adequate to
meet great constitutional tasks unless its breadth of view and flexibility
of adaptation are fitted and proportioned to the specific scheme and
purpose. Is it not therefore clear that to eviscerate some of that great
Justice's words from an opinion and to rely on their general tenor for
the solution of a specific constitutional problem is precisely the thing
he warned against doing? Does this not then do a disservice to a great
Justice, as well as degrade a noble principle, by making it the handmaiden to an ignoble purpose? There can, of course, be but one answer.
The fallacy of the arguments which seek, on the basis of the Olmstead
dissent, to overturn Walder can be traced to the improper rephrasing
of the problem into terms to which, as lawyers, the judges and commentators have become accustomed. Then, by treating the question as
though it were the rephrased issue, the facile answer appears axiomatic
and, because familiar, authorative. Thus, the argument runs: use of
illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes allows the
government to profit by its own wrong; the government shall not be
allowed to profit by its own wrong; therefore, the government cannot
use illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes. The syllo102 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1904).

103 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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gism is insidiously persuasive at first blush. However, subtle questionbegging is still question-begging, and the apparent exactness is delusive
nonetheless.
Thus, the question which must be answered is under what circumstances will the government, in legal contemplation, be deemed to
have profited from its own wrong. It was to this question which
Justice Frankfurter in Walder addressed himself.
The situation presented by Walder is wholly distinguishable from
that contemplated by the Holmes-Brandeis dissents in Olmstead. In
every case, save Walder, in which the Supreme Court has dealt with
affronts to the "integrity of the fact-finding process," the affront was
initiated by the government; that is, the government had violated a
defendant's constitutional rights and had then attempted to exploit
that illegality and gain an advantage therefrom. The defendant in
such situations had played an entirely passive or quiescent role.
How very different is this from the Walder situation. There the government made no attempt to capitalize on its initial illegality. Indeed,
there was no sin of commission here save on the part of the defendant
who sought to profit from his own and the government's improper
actions. 04
Thus, in holding that in such a case the government is not precluded
from impeaching the defendant with the illegally obtained evidence,
Justice Frankfurter was tacitly saying that the government had not,
in legal contemplation, profited from its own wrong or played an ignoble
part. Hence, when the government does not seek to affirmatively use
tainted evidence either in its direct examination of the defendant or
under the "guise" of cross-examination, it has not violated these principles espoused by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in their dissents in
Olmstead.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's decision in Walder is not inconsistent
with the Holmes-Brandeis dissents. The briefest survey of the Justice's
constitutional philosophy supports the theory that Walder is perfectly
consistent with the Olmstead dissents.0 5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
accepted the principles espoused by Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead
throughout his judicial career. Indeed, his own frequent enunciation of
104 Compare Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
05

See the articles collected in 76 HARv. L.

cated to Mr. Justice Frankfurter.

REv.

1-24 (1962). This issue was dedi-
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them may have even surpassed in clarity, lambency, and richness of
expression those of his illustrious predecessors. 106 Thus, to assert
that Walder is somehow violative of those principles requires the
incredible conclusion that Justice Frankfurter himself was either indifferent to or misunderstood them.
Those who would rely on the words of Justices Brandeis and Holmes
in Olmstead to support their cause 0 7 would do well to delve beyond
the superficial import of the words of the phrase, the government shall
not profit from its own wrong or play an ignoble part, and to treat these
words not as ends but as vehicles to convey meaning. And, they would
do well to remember that "a word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
08
used."
THE STANDARDS

WHICH DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY IN

THE

CASE-IN-CHIEF ARE NOT THE SAME AS THOSE WHICH
DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY

FOR IMPEACHMENT

Some courts have attempted to distinguish Walder from Miranda on
the invidious ground of the differences in "reliability of the evidence"
obtained by the respective violations. Indeed, the court in Groshart
admitted that "it may be that there are noteworthy differences regarding the reliability of the evidence depending upon whether it consists
of statements obtained through police interrogation or of the tangible
fruits of a search and seizure."' 1 9
To be sure, reliability of evidence is of salient importance in determining whether or not the government should be allowed to use the
tainted evidence to impeach. Certainly, tangible evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment is irrefragibly reliable. Thus, not
to allow such evidence for impeachment would allow and encourage
106 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (dissenting opinion); Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1957) (concurring opinion) ; Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (dissenting opinion); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943).
107 See note 7, supra.
10

8 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).

109392 F.2d 172 n.5

(1968) (emphasis added). Accord, Commonwealth v. Padgett,
428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968).
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perjury by the defendant. The "integrity" of our judicial system demands that this not be tolerated.
But is a statement gained by a technical violation of Miranda any
less reliable? "It is true that if a prior admission were found to be unconstitutionally coerced, the substantial probability that the admission
is no more reliable than the contrary testimony of the accused at trial
should lead a court to proceed with caution in permitting its use for
impeachment purposes. [Cite omitted] But where .. there is no good
reason to believe that a prior inconsistent statement was not accurate
and voluntary,... the Walder principle [should be] controlling.""'
In acknowledging the importance of reliability, as a criterion in determining admissibility of illegally seized evidence for impeachment
purposes, where the violation is of the fourth amendment, the Ninth
Circuit in Groshart has, by implication, demonstrated the importance
of protecting the federal judiciary against a defendant who would
seek to turn the illegal method by which evidence in the government's
possession was obtained to his own advantage and provide himself
with a shield against contradictions of his own untruths. It has also
manifested the untenability of the argument which seeks to distinguish the exclusionary rule of the fourth from that of the fifth amendment.
To contend that the fifth amendment's exclusionary rule is irrecrusable while that of the fourth is not, is surely to move into the world
of Alice in Wonderland. Such a view is necessarily dependent upon an
antecedent determination that the fifth amendment protects a more
profound complex of values than does the fourth and therefore ranks
higher in the constitutional hierarchy. Yet, such a scale of respective
values is chimerical; it simply is nonexistent. Whatever posture one
may take as to the "preferred position" argument regarding the first
amendment,"' it is clear that the fifth and the fourth are on equal
constitutional footing. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that the
fourth and fifth amendments run "almost into each other 11 2 and
"enjoy an 'intimate relation' in their perpetuation of 'principles of humanity and civil liberty (secured) ...only after years of struggle.' M13
110 United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 912 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
873 (1965). But see, United States v. Fox, -

F.2d -

111 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
112 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
113 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).

(2d Cir. 1968).
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Since the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment does not preclude the government wholly and absolutely from using evidence illegally obtained, then that of the fifth surely should not. Thus, the real
question is not merely whether there has been a violation, and surely,
not what amendment has been violated. The real question is whether
the evidence obtained is possessed of sufficient reliability so that in
order to prevent perjury and open affronts to the fact-finding process
it should be admissible for impeachment purposes where "collateral"
matters only are involved. And, surely, not all statements obtained in
violation of Miranda fail to possess the requisite degree of reliability
so that they must be excluded when offered for impeachment rather
than affirmative case-in-chief purposes. While it is true that Miranda
was designed to obviate the ad hoc determination of the question of
voluntariness of statements given during in-custody interrogation, it
does not necessarily follow that the same policy must or should be
applied when the issue is use of evidence for impeachment rather than
affirmative case-in-chief purposes, for the considerations and interests
involved differ markedly.
CONCLUSION

Thus, in certain instances, the law and society are better served when
flexible standards, capable of being individualized to meet the needs
of varying conditions, take precedence over the obdurate rule with
its mechanical application. The process of adjudication, especially
constitutional adjudication, is a phase of an incessant movement. Consequently, something more is demanded of those who are to play their
proper role in it than imitative reproduction, the lifeless repetition of
a mechanical routine. Those who denigrate Walder should pause for a
moment and realize that all constitutional questions present a choice
of nicely balanced alternatives, each possessing weighty title deeds.
Yet, true constitutional statesmanship calls not for a selection of one,
vis-a-vis the other, but rather for an accommodation of both. I believe
that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Walder, achieved a workable accommodation between the rival principles, and thus we should pause long
and thoughtfully before abandoning the Walder rationale.

